Because illiquid bonds may be relatively poorly priced, the ability to infer investor perceptions of changes in a banking organization's financial health from such bonds may be obscured. To examine the time-series effect of trading frequency on subordinated debt spreads, we consider the liquidity of subordinated debt for large, complex U.S. banking organizations over the 1987:Q2 -2002:Q4 period. Since trade volumes are unobservable, we construct various measures of weekly trading frequency from observed bond prices. Using these indirect liquidity measures, we find evidence that trading frequency does significantly affect observed subordinated debt spreads. We also provide estimates for the premium of illiquidity.
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980's, a growing number of observers have proposed using subordinated debt as a vehicle for improved market discipline.
1 Because subordinated debt holders have an incentive to monitor a banking organization's financial condition, observed subordinated debt spreads could provide informative signals of these investors' perceptions. However, there are several reasons why subordinated debt spreads may not accurately reflect investor perceptions of risk. 2 For example, Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast (2004) 3 demonstrate that the risk-sensitivity of bank funding manager decisions affect observed subordinated debt issuance spreads. And, Birchler and Hancock (2004) 4 show that subordinated debt issuance spreads are influenced by the (less sophisticated) perceptions of senior debt investors.
In this study, we consider whether trading frequency significantly influences time-series information on large, complex, banking organization subordinated debt spreads. There are at least two reasons why this is an important topic. First, illiquid bonds, which do not trade as frequently as other bonds, may be relatively poorly priced. Consequently, it may be difficult to make inferences about investor perceptions regarding changes in a banking organization's financial condition. Second, in volatile bond markets, the uncertainty about an illiquid bond's price may be larger. But, such times may be those when supervisors may be most interested in the views of market participants. prices for a bond significantly increases its spread. And, bonds that are traded highly frequently have significantly lower spreads than less frequently traded bonds.
MEASURING TRADING FREQUENCY
A direct measure of a bond's trading frequency would be its number or dollar volume of trades. But, the bond market is an over-the-counter market where the volume of trades for each bond is not disclosed. Instead, we use various indirect measures for weekly trading frequency for each bond that are derived from daily time-series information on Bloomberg "generic" bond prices. These prices are constructed using the consensus method, which averages observed trading prices after dropping the highest and lowest observations. A minimum of three observations is required, after dropping the highest and lowest observations, for a price to be valid, otherwise a missing value is entered for the trading price. This algorithm ensures that at least five trades occur on each date when a generic price is reported.
From this pricing series, we construct several trading frequency variables for each bond:
(1) the number of weeks since the last generic bond price was reported, nweeks; (2) an indicator variable that equals one, when there has been an increase in the number of traded prices reported for adjoining weeks, upindicator; (3) a "low" trading frequency indicator variable, pricefreq g , g=1,2 and 3, that equals one when "generic" prices are reported for only 1, 2 or 3 days in the week, and zero otherwise, and (4) a "high" trading frequency indicator variable, pricefreq 5 , that equals one when "generic" prices are reported for all 5 days in the week, and zero otherwise.
We consider 211 bonds traded in the secondary market over the 1987: Q2 -2002:Q4 period, which were issued by 22 large, complex, banking organizations that have been monitored monthly by U.S. bank supervisors.
5 For a bond to be included in the sample, its amount -3-outstanding at issuance had to exceed $75 million and there had to be a minimum of 20 weeks with generic prices reported by Bloomberg during the sample period. Economics, 33, February, 12. June data are used for the firm size stratifications in each year of the sample.
13. Increases in overall corporate bond spreads are sometimes explained by an increase in risk aversion or by a flight to quality.
-5-EXRET t , a measure of the performance of small firms relative to large firms, SMB t , and a measure of the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks, HML t .
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Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data are used to compute a weekly average of daily excess stock returns, EXRET t . The daily excess stock market returns are calculated as the difference between the daily value-weighted return on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks and the off-the-run one-month Treasury return.
The relative performance measures, SMB t and HML t , are also calculated from CRSP data.
Both of these measures depend on stratifications with respect to firm-size and with respect to book-to-market equity ratios. In each year, firms with NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks are classified as "small," when their size (price times shares) is less than the median firm size for the NYSE. And, firms are classified as "large," when their size is greater than the median firm size for the NYSE.
12 In each year, firms are also stratified into three book-to-market equity groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30 percent, "low," the middle 40 percent, "medium,"
and the top 30 percent, "high." The relative performance measure, SMB t , is calculated as the difference between returns on small-firm and big-firm stock portfolios with about the same weighted-average book-to-market equity. Similarly, the relative performance measure, HML t , is calculated as the difference in returns on high-and low-book-to-market equity portfolios with about the same weighted-average size.
During periods of bond market stress, such as the post-Russian default period of AugustOctober 1998, sharp increases in overall corporate bond spreads over Treasuries with comparable maturities can occur. 13 To proxy for bond market risk, we use an implied stock market volatility, bondvolatility t , which is exogenous to, but highly correlated with, bond market volatiliy. Our volatility measure, which is computed from CRSP data, equals the weekly standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 stock returns.
14. One bank indicator is dropped from the regression to avoid singularity. Parameter estimates for the other bank indicators can be viewed as relative to the omitted indicator.
15. Because market leverage for week t depends on the weekly average for the common stock price observed for each banking organization, the contemporaneous market leverage variable is only known at the end-of-day on the end-of-week. Understandably, the contemporaneous market leverage variable was statistically insignificant even at the 10 percent level in model specifications that included it.
-6-To ascertain the effects of trading frequency on banking organization subordinated debt spreads, we use our panel data to estimate the following fixed-effects regression: For similar reasons, two lags for the bond market volatility measure were included in the model.
Because the premium contained in the spread did not appear to be a linear function of the number of weeks since the last observed generic price, we used various indicator variables constructed from nweeks bt of different time-interval lengths (e.g., a week, a month, a quarter, two quarters, a year, etc.).
16. Indicator variables of lengths one week, two to four weeks, five to 12 weeks, and 13 to 26 weeks were individually and together insignificant at the five and ten percent level of confidence. Similarly, parameter estimates for indicators between 27 and 104 weeks were not significantly different from one another, so the more parsimonious specification is reported here.
17. Inclusion of interaction terms between the nweeks indicator variables and conteporaneous bond market volatility measures in the model suggest that the spread differential between actively-and inactively-traded bonds rises with bond market volatility.
-7-
FINDINGS
Parameter estimates, t-statistics, and the R 2 for the "best-fit specification" that omits the indicator variable for nweeks bt for one to 26 weeks (i.e., 1 week to 6 months) and includes indicator variables for 27 to 104 weeks and for greater than 104 weeks (i.e., 2 years) are presented in Table 1 . 16 As expected, the banking organization-specific default risk proxy (i.e., the lagged marketlev variables) were not only significant, but also positive. This means that an increase in default risk increased observed secondary market spreads. Moreover, an increase in bond market volatility, significantly increased observed banking organization secondary subordinated debt spreads: The parameter estimates on bondvolatility t-1 and bondvolatility t-2 are both positive and significant at the 5 percent level of confidence.
Not surprisingly, the common risk factors that affect aggregate corporate bond spreads and stock market returns also influenced banking organization subordinated debt spreads. Each of the common risk factors, EXRET, SMB, and HML, significantly influenced observed secondary spreads on banking organization subordinated debt instruments.
Trading frequency measures importantly influenced observed secondary spreads for banking organization subordinated debt instruments. In particular, the longer the lapse between observed traded prices, measured using nweeks bt j , the higher the secondary subordinated debt spread. Bonds that did not have generic prices available for 27 to 104 weeks had spreads that were, on average, 19 basis points higher than bonds with generic prices available more frequently. And, spreads on bonds that did not have generic prices available for two years or longer were on average 64 basis points higher than spreads on bonds that had such prices available within a six-month period. 17 This is economically significant since the average spread observed for the sample period was only 101.78 basis points. Surprisingly, generic pricing 18. Since some of the organizations no longer exist, banking organizations are ordered by their total asset size in their last year of existence during the sample period. -8-lapses of less than six months did not materially or significantly affect spreads. This is likely why data sources that employ matrix prices (e.g., Bloomberg Fair Value and Interactive Data Corporation) remain popular with market practitioners.
In addition, the weekly trading frequency indicator variables were statistically significant, of the expected sign, and of plausible magnitude. The "high" trading frequency indicator (pricefreq bt 5 ) parameter estimate is significant and equal to -0.016. This means that spreads on bonds that have generic prices available for each day of the week are about 1.6 basis points lower than spreads on bonds that have generic prices available less frequently during the week. The insignificant "low" trading frequency indicator (pricefreq bt 123 ) parameter estimate means that trading four days per week does not reduce the spread that is observed when a bond trades only 1, 2 or 3 days per week.
The parameter estimate on the indicator variable, upindicator, which signaled an increase in the number of generic prices reported for adjoining weeks, was not statistically significant though it was of the expected (i.e., negative) sign. This finding is consistent with the lack of a statistical difference in the spreads for bonds traded between one and four times per week. What really matters is whether a generic price is available all the time (i.e., every day during the week), or less frequently.
Banking organization-specific effects importantly influenced observed secondary spreads. The parameter estimates for the banking organization indicators are ordered in Table 1 so that the largest banking organization (measured using total consolidated assets) is first and the smallest banking organization is last. -9-for debt issued by "known names" are lower than the spreads for debt issued by other banking organizations. 20 
CONCLUSION
Trading frequency measures significantly influence the observed subordinated debt spreads on instruments issued by large domestic banking organizations. When a bond does not have generic prices available for every business day during the week, its observed spreads will be about 1.5 basis points higher. When a bond has not received a generic price on Bloomberg for between 6 months and two years, it will have a spread that is about 20 basis points higher than a bond that has traded within the last six months. And, when the interval between generic prices is longer than two years, the spread will typically be 64 basis points higher than for a bond that has generic prices available within the preceding six month period. These rules-of-thumb derived from the estimated time-series model can potentially be used to adjust banking organization subordinated debt spreads calculated from observed generic prices to place frequently-and infrequently-traded bonds on a more comparable basis.
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